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Enmity in the Intellectual World: 
Global Perspectives and Visions
Abstract This paper follows the perception of enmity relations in the recent 
online contributions of 20 global intellectual ‘superstars’, such as Habermas, Klein, 
Žižek and others. We observed two, very general distinctions; the first one includes 
several geopolitical oppositions such as Germany vs. the rest of the EU, Russia 
vs. the West and national vs. supranational, while the second is between the 
majority and privileged few/elites. We argue that contemporary intellectuals are 
still influential public figures, and that their efforts are more directed at empowerment 
and reform of the societies through the existing system than at promoting and 
advocating alternatives to the existing neoliberal socio-economical order.
Keywords: Intellectuals, enmity, public, elites, change 
Anyone attempting to provide a general, consensual working definition of 
intellectuals or their role and impact in/on society faces a daunting task, and 
is easily reminded of the famous verse from Ecclesiastes: “For with much 
wisdom comes much sorrow”. The proverb applies both to intellectuals and 
those wishing to study them, for their differentia specifica, relevance, public 
and emancipatory role have all been a matter of both their own internal and 
also broader scholarly disputes.
For those like Alvin Gouldner, intellectuals are our best card in history 
(Gouldner, 1979). Perhaps claiming that they pave the way for humanity is 
an overstatement, but they do indicate social change and its directions. They 
are a valuable part of societal landscape, providing legitimation (or some-
times delegitimation) of the prevailing order. Less enthusiastic but none-
theless instructive are Baert and Shipman, who rightfully point out that a 
significant number of current, high profile intellectuals come from the ac-
ademia – e.g. J. Butler, N. Chomsky, P. Krugman, E. Said, A. Giddens, etc. 
(Baert and Shipman, 2012: 187).
On the opposite end, we find now rather frequent assumption that the role 
of intellectual is on the wane, especially when compared to earlier moral au-
thorities like Zola, Solzhenitsyn, Sartre etc. ( Jacoby, 1987; Posner, 2001). The 
paradigm itself comes from a perception that intellectuals more and more 
fail to “speak truth to power” (Havel, 1985; Said, 1996), and fail to address 
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the public as they once did. In recent years, yet another set of arguments 
claiming the fall of intellectuals has emerged, which we could name as the 
set of structural arguments. These arguments are linked with social conditions 
of knowledge production, claiming that extremely increased specialization 
of knowledge has led to limited space for intellectual engagement on one 
side ( Jacoby, 1987). A similar line of reasoning also notes that universities, a 
large source of intellectual work, have interests intertwined with other so-
cial realms, like economy and politics, which increasingly limits the scope 
of engagement of intellectuals (Nisbet, 1997). This is, of course, related to 
the normative argument that intellectuals should be independent and ought 
to “speak truth to power”, but that they become instruments for production 
of social order and ultimately for satisfying the economic needs of society.
Pushing this outlook further ties us back to a reputable self-critical intel-
lectual tradition that, to say the least, disputes the view of intellectuals as a 
vanguard of subversion and emancipation. Nearly a century ago, Antonio 
Gramsci dared to label intellectuals insistent on independence as utopian: 
“this position assumed by the social complex of intellectuals [and] can be de-
fined as the expression of that social utopia by which the intellectuals think 
of themselves as ʻindependent’, autonomous, endowed with a character of 
their own, etc.”; instead, he claimed that “[e]very social group, coming into 
existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of 
economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more 
strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own 
function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” 
(Gramsci 1989: 112-113). Only a few years later, Robert Michels wrote in 
similar fashion that observing intellectuals as immanently revolutionary is 
not in accord with the facts (Michels in Karabel, 1996: 206). Quite to the con-
trary, intellectuals are the officers and subaltern of all arms and armies, of 
those revolutionary, reactionary and even of reformative political forces. We 
therefore cannot claim that intellectuals were ever independent from social 
conditions of their societies (or global society lately), nor that they (as a social 
network) could claim moral characteristics of few individuals who were per-
ceived as the protagonists. Karabel voices this current of thought as follows:
“It is thus misleading to assume, as does much of the existing literature, 
that intellectuals will typically adopt an oppositional stance towards the 
existing order; most of them have, after all, attained a relatively privileged 
position within it, and their well-being often depends upon the acquisition 
of resources controlled by political and economic elites with whom they 
are socially and culturally linked. From this vantage point, what needs to 
be explained is less why intellectuals reach accommodations with the sta-
tus quo than what it is that causes some of them, at certain historical moments, 
to rebel” (Karabel, 1996).
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This contested framework calls for some moderation. There are authors who 
oppose the paradigm of intellectual decline and find it deceiving, but at the 
same time acknowledge structural changes of society and different func-
tions of the intellectuals (Baert and Shipman, 2012; Bauman, 1989; Bour-
dieu, 1988; etc.). The proponents of this view could be said to subscribe to 
Bourdieu’s notion of intellectuals as the dominated fraction of the dominant 
class (Bourdieu, 1990), and yet point to new channels of intellectual engage-
ment with the public that did not exist before and are frequently missed in 
analyses. Indeed, it can be argued from this vantage point that public space 
has been democratized in the previous two decades, allowing significant-
ly more equality in participation and expression, particularly if we observe 
the online realm. Of course, one needs to be very careful when making such 
conclusions on a global scale, but even with issues such as censorship of the 
Internet in some parts of the world, there is a general possibility of an un-
bounded online public engagement that cannot be easily disregarded.
Whom to consider as intellectuals?
In moving forward towards addressing the question of contemporary in-
tellectuals and their perception of enmity, we tried to avoid the pitfalls of 
overarching definitions by relying on material less likely to be thought of as 
controversial by either intellectualophiles or intellectualoclasts. Patrick Baert 
suggests that Pierre Bourdieu (1988), Charles Camic (1987) and Randal Col-
lins (1998) could be named as fathers of the sociology of intellectuals, while 
at the same time acknowledging the lack of research dealing with the pub-
lic engagement of intellectuals (Baert and Shipman, 2012). By naming them 
public intellectuals, Baert seeks to stress their role in society as well as their 
engagement in the public realm as terra incognita that should be explored 
since we need to know how ideas, theories and concepts find their way to 
the wider public and into public discourse. However, we subscribe less to 
this distinction between public and other intellectuals, and rather hold that 
being public is intrinsic to being an intellectual. Having in mind this public 
aspect of their work, we emphasize an even greater lack of studies on con-
temporary intellectuals, not only the founding fathers.
We perceive intellectuals as the loose elite network of specific social actors who 
possess advanced knowledge or creativity recognized in the cultural field of aca-
demia and/or art. They draw certain authority or power to be heard from their 
position in the network. Finally, they are publicly engaged in a way that they 
address the public beyond their professional audience (Pudar Draško, 2016). 
In this sense, we readily recognize the public aura surrounding contempo-
rary thinkers such as Butler, Chomsky, Žižek and others, but without imbru-
ing them with an a priori positive or emancipatory public role. Therefore, 
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while recognizing their public presence and, arguably also influence, we still 
wonder whether the intellectuals with the strongest public profiles indeed 
sow the seed of social change through their discourse? And if they do, what 
is the direction of this orientation: emancipatory or conservative, reformist 
or consolidative? This question is far from trivial. Indeed, with due respect 
to great examples of intellectual defiance and courage, some of the authors 
we have mentioned have argued rather convincingly that actually the oppo-
site of courage and defiance tends to be the rule.
In our text, we have focused on online publications of global intellectuals, 
many of whom work at universities and/or hold academic titles or positions. 
We have thus left out a substantial, and certainly important, aspect of their 
endeavour within national and state borders. Intellectuals we cover here are 
precisely global intellectuals, since they enter the online global public space 
and publish in renowned English language newspapers and magazines. For 
a convenient and representative sample of global intellectual writings on 
enmity, we relied on the contribution of 20 intellectuals proclaimed to be 
“world thinkers” by British Prospect magazine in 2013, 2014 and 20151. The 
analysis focused on their articles, blogs and op-eds published online in the 
period from 2012 until August 2016. In the first step, all contributions still 
available online were collected (app. 390) and a sample of 25% per each per-
son was included in the analysis. These 106 contributions were then submit-
ted to critical discourse analysis. We searched for narratives and framings 
that operationalize enmity relations and/or those pinpointing the desired 
change. We were particularly attentive to the US and THEM distinction, 
alongside with the corresponding markers such as pronouns (“we”, “they”, 
“us”, “them”, “our”) but also deixes like “here” and “there”, as the most funda-
mental discursive markers (van Dijk 1993; 2009: 52). For the sake of clarity, 
enmity relations in this article denominate all those oppositional relations, 
where we could identify a clear distinction between us and them and between 
desirable and non-desirable.
1  Included intellectuals, in alphabetical order, with the number of collected postings: 
Arundhati Roy, writer (28), Esther Duflo, economist (6), Daniel Kahneman, psychologist 
(8), Amartya Sen, economist and philosopher (24), Anne Applebaum, publicist (40), 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, political scientist (24), Ha-Joon Chang, economist (29), Hilary 
Mantel, writer (12), Jürgen Habermas, philosopher (9), Mao Yushi, economist (13), Mar-
ilynne Robinson, writer (8), Martha Nussbaum, philosopher (15), Naomi Klein, journal-
ist (29), Paul Krugman, economist (41), Peter Higgs, physicist (5), Raghuram Rajan, 
economist (19), Rebecca Solnit, writer (23), Roberto Mangabeira Unger, philosopher (7), 
Slavoj Žižek, philosopher (35) and Thomas Piketty, economist (26). The list of included 
intellectuals is based on their presence in the list for at least two out of three years. This 
means that some intellectuals whose contribution spiked in only one year, like Yanis 
Varoufakis, were excluded from consideration.
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How do “world thinkers” operationalise otherness  
in their narratives?
Several oppositions or enmity perceptions spark across the included arti-
cles of prominent contemporary intellectuals. For analytical purposes, we 
make the distinction between geopolitical enmities and structural/system-
ic enmities. The first category includes identified oppositions between dif-
ferent geopolitical entities and leans very much on culture as the root of 
distinction. The second category introduces elites – privileged bearers of 
economic and socio-political power relative to others, especially to mar-
ginalized groups of citizens. In the following section, we will illustrate these 
two enmity categories and intellectuals’ perception of their causes and pos-
sible progressive change.
a. Systemic geopolitical oppositions 
The geopolitical opposition is a three-fold one. First, these intellectuals dis-
tinguish Germany from the rest of the European Union, which coincides with 
the break out of the Grexit crisis and the war in Ukraine in this period.
“Germany is a reluctant but insensitive and incapable hegemon that both uses 
and ignores the disturbed European balance of power at the same time 
(emphasis added).” (Habermas, 2016)
“Germany — not the European Union, and certainly not the United States 
— has convened all of the important meetings, pushed through sanctions 
and conducted most of the diplomacy designed to allow Russian President 
Vladimir Putin to ʻ deescalate’ or to ʻ give him an off ramp’ or whatever for-
mulation is currently fashionable. Although it isn’t clear that this diplo-
matic effort has borne fruit, no one doubts that Germany has played a cen-
tral role and will continue to do so (emphasis added).” (Applebaum, 2014a)
Germany is thus perceived as the key player on the European scene, the 
nation whose strong diplomacy without any doubt defines the direction 
of EU politics. This power also bears responsibility, and intellectuals tend 
to hold Germany responsible for the future of the EU more than any other 
(nation) state.
Second, it seems that old and implicitly backward nineteenth-century argu-
ments regarding the supremacy of Western(ised) world vs. Other have re-
turned to the scene in intellectual discourse. Again, the geopolitical context 
placed a strong focus on Russia as the personification of the Other. This sig-
nificant Other is implicitly characterized with non-Europeanism – the lack 
of democracy, oligarchy and dominance of the ethnicity as opposed to the 
Western model of citizenry.
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“For Russia, the point of the war is not to achieve a victory. The point is 
to prevent the emergence of anything resembling a prosperous, Europe-
an Ukraine because such a state would pose an ideological threat to Pu-
tinism.” (Applebaum, 2015)
“If Ukraine ends up with a mixture of ethnic fundamentalism and liber-
al capitalism, with oligarchs pulling the strings, it will be as European as 
Russia (or Hungary) is today.” (Žižek, 2014)
In addition, or rather contrary to such narratives, racism is identified as be-
ing ever-present, receiving a new face of climate ignorance which directly 
endangers marginalized races of the non-Western world.
“Thinly veiled notions of racial superiority have informed every aspect 
of the non response to climate change so far. Racism is what has made it 
possible to systematically look away from the climate threat for more than 
two decades.” (Klein, 2014)
Finally, the third geopolitical opposition revolves around the national vs. su-
pranational distinction as a relatively new axis in international affairs. Con-
temporary thinkers criticize phenomena such as the rise of right-wing pop-
ulism and crisis of values within the EU as the regression to nation states, 
seen as resilient or resurrected political units.
“This colonialization of societies, which disintegrate from within and take 
up right wing populist positions against each other, will not change as long 
as no political power can be found with the courage to take up the cause of 
achieving the political aim of universalizing interests beyond national frontiers, 
if only within Europe or the Eurozone (emphasis added).” (Habermas, 2015)
“The rise in national self-interests has undoubtedly prevented Europeans 
from adapting their institutions and their policies.” (Piketty, 2016)
“One result of European monetary integration, without a political integra-
tion, is that the population of many of these countries has no voice. Eco-
nomics is de linked from the political base.” (Amartya Sen in Storbeck, 2012)
Thus, the prevailing opinion among intellectuals is that the current state of 
affairs on European level is not satisfactory, meaning it does not lead to real 
unification or “universalizing interests beyond national frontiers”. National 
elites still hold the lion’s share of power; this prevents the development of 
functional EU institutions that would otherwise not be as alienated from cit-
izens nor divorced from democratic control as they appear to be at present.
b. Minority vs. Majority: “the Enemy is the People”
The second category of structural/systemic enmities could also be presented 
as multidimensional. Its core is definitely the opposition between common, 
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marginalized people, or better put, the majority, and the privileged few or 
the elites. This is best summarized in the words of Arundhati Roy that “ei-
ther way, the Enemy is the People” (Roy, 2016).
 “We are stuck because the actions that would give us the best chance of 
averting catastrophe – and would benefit the vast majority – are extreme-
ly threatening to an elite minority that has a stranglehold over our econo-
my, our political process, and most of our major media outlets (emphasis 
added).” (Klein, 2015)
“...[t]alks a lot about the need to make tough decisions, which somehow al-
ways involves demanding sacrifices on the part of ordinary families while 
treating the wealthy with kid gloves (emphasis added).” (Krugman, 2013)
“Anyone who argues that doing something about global warming will be 
too expensive is dodging just how expensive unmitigated climate change 
is already proving to be. It’s only a question of whether the very wealthy or 
the very poor will pay (emphasis added).” (Solnit, 2014)
Intellectuals emphasize that the enmity among ordinary citizens and pow-
erful elites is raised to a level rather familiar in history – the “commoners” 
are intensively portrayed as lazy, morally unsuitable and generally speak-
ing to be blamed for their own poor destiny. However, in distinction to the 
earlier instances of this antagonism, contemporary thinkers emphasize the 
unlikelihood, if not the impossibility, of an uprising or upheaval that would 
turn the tables round and truly endanger the elites.  
„What’s happening here at the moment is really ugly. The government por-
trays poor and unfortunate people as being morally defective (emphasis added).” 
(Hilary Mantel in Scheuermann, 2014)
“Gone are the days when the upper classes were terrified of the angry mob 
wanting to smash their skulls and confiscate their properties. Now their 
biggest enemy is the army of lazy bums, whose lifestyle of indolence and he-
donism, financed by crippling taxes on the rich, is sucking the lifeblood 
out of the economy (emphasis added).” (Chang, 2013)
Predictably, intellectuals hold that, in addition to the public being manipu-
lated by the elites, the system itself is corrupt and subject to the will of the 
powerful and wealthy for the sake of their own interests. Such a situation is 
recognized by various intellectuals, from those who advocate moderate state 
intervention for the benefit of citizens, to those who lean strongly towards 
the free market (i.e. M. Yushi).
“The biggest reason to oppose the power of money in politics is the way it 
lets the wealthy rig the system and distorts policy priorities (emphasis add-
ed).” (Krugman, 2016)
340
EnmITy In ThE InTEllEcTUAl WORlDGazela Pudar draško, aleksandar Pavlović
“So it is true that we live in a society of risky choices, but some people (the 
managers) do the choosing, while others (the common people) do the risking (em-
phasis added).” (Žižek, 2013)
“They get extra income because of … privilege power. Big state enterpris-
es are vested interest groups. They collude with politicians.” (Mao Yushi 
in Montlake, 2012)
While the aforementioned “solutions” of either redistribution or further lib-
eralisation fundamentally rest on the implied faith in the neo-liberal frame-
work, the causes for this situation, set to work for the privileged elites, are 
identified with the structural factors of the capitalist system and its inability 
to resolve socio-economic problems, particularly visible in periods of crisis. 
Any downturn of the economy exposes latent social tensions where “people 
are unable to solve their social and unemployment and domestic problems 
through peaceful policies” (Piketty in Kumar, 2015). Such crises destroy so-
cial cohesion of societies and bring into the surface the injustice of the sys-
tem, making “a mockery of the self- conception of democratically constituted 
societies” (Habermas, 2015). In addition, globalization cannot be overlooked, 
especially those of its consequences that alienate citizens from power owner-
ship, causing regression to intolerant, isolationist and nationalist sentiments, 
which are then removed from any serious discussion on the political level.
c. What is to be done?
The leading contemporary intellectuals certainly advocate strongly for pow-
er to be given to the people, oppressed by the powerful elites. They also 
openly claim that mass movements and protests in general are a way to ef-
fect change. This trust in the social movements is obvious and largely a con-
sequence of the new rising wave of movements from the USA, across the 
Arab world to Europe. Also, social movements are seen as a source of possi-
ble political alternative, which could enter the political scene and take pow-
er, pumping fresh blood into old liberal democratic systems, in order to heal 
but also change them in a way that would satisfy citizens’ needs more than 
previous systems have done so far.
“Mass movements work. Unarmed citizens have changed the course of histo-
ry countless times in the modern era. When we come together as civil so-
ciety, we have the capacity to transform policies, change old ways of doing 
things, and sometimes even topple regimes (emphasis added).” (Solnit, 2014)
“A street movement’s success isn’t determined by the crowds it can mo-
bilize, the clever slogans its members chant or even the government min-
isters it persuades to resign. Success is creating a real political alternative 
— and then getting that alternative elected to power (emphasis added).” 
(Applebaum, 2014b)
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In their most progressive instances, intellectual narratives thus invoke a vi-
sion of change identified with bringing voice and power back to citizens. 
They advocate public engagement related to and invested in the movements, 
but also the necessity of a more general cultural change for reclaiming own-
ership of society. Personal responsibility, on one side, and securing basic 
common ground for living in a society on the other, are the prerequisites for 
achieving a better society in which even “the enemy itself starts to use your 
language, so that your ideas form the foundation of the entire field” (Žižek). 
Accordingly, some voices advocate a more progressive approach, which 
would allow citizens to truly participate in the decision and policy-making 
where “institutional arrangements need to be left open to experimentation 
and revision according to what works for the project of the empowerment 
of humanity” (Roberto Unger in Keliher, 2012). 
Conclusion
As we argued, irrespective of whether one sees intellectuals merely as mes-
sengers of other social groups or real actors of social change, their perception 
of enmity relations and their own positioning provides insight into possible 
directions of social change in society. Thus, we understand intellectuals as 
those actors who give meaning and visibility to enmity through their dis-
course and narratives. Arguably, the main enmity relations and distinctions 
identified here could be taken as a personification of the ideological clashes 
in the globalized contemporary world.
In such circumstances, several intellectuals place emphasis on their own role 
and responsibility. They stress the need to use their resources in order to 
identify and present the vision for the society, to employ what has conve-
niently been labelled as “structural imagination – imagination of how struc-
tural change takes place in history and of how we can understand the prev-
alence of the existing arrangements without vindicating their necessity or 
their authority” (Social Science Bites, 2014). What is more, they imply that 
the work of intellectuals thus appears to bring changes to the ideas and values 
which may seem “insignificant or peripheral until very different outcomes 
emerge from transformed assumptions about who and what matters, who 
should be heard and believed, who has rights” (Solnit, 2016). 
In general, intellectuals seek greater mobilization of citizens through social 
movements and other forms of bottom-up engagement that need to be built 
into the core of the system. Bringing power back to the people is a leitmotif of 
their discourse. Their perception and perspective is clearly international, in-
sofar as they see this empowerment as restrained in two ways – through geo-
political enmities depicting clashes between different levels of (inter)national 
organizations of states, and other structural/systemic enmities portraying 
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the inherent clashes of capitalist societies between the elites and the rest. As 
we have mentioned, the emphasis on racism within the Western discourse 
about climate change was arguably very important for understanding the 
standing points of the majority of the intellectuals, who implicitly tend to 
expect the West to enlighten and take care of the rest of the Earth. The vi-
sion of their desired society thus posits a more significant role for the state, 
which needs to develop a more balanced power structure in order to dimin-
ish inequality and allow for greater citizens’ participation.
Yet, critical and attuned as they are to political and economic elites’ use of 
power for their own (selfish) benefits, intellectuals still overall rarely ques-
tion liberal democracy as such. Nor do they question its basis in the market 
economy, focusing instead on the empowerment of humanity within this sys-
tem. Perhaps, as some aforementioned authors have claimed, it is precisely 
their comfortable position of leading mainstream intellectuals that might 
be preventing them from seeing and offering more radical alternatives to 
the system and imagining a different society. Nonetheless, insofar as this 
article contributes in identifying the basic mainstream positions and an-
tagonisms in the contemporary intellectual discourses, it does recognize 
traces of more radical thinking that could emerge into mainstream public 
discourse via intellectual engagement amidst clashes that shake and shape 
the contemporary world.
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neprijateljstvo u intelektualnom svetu:  
globalne perspektive i vizije 
Apstrakt
U ovom radu se dotičemo percepcije neprijateljskih odnosa u skorašnjim online 
prilozima 20 globalnih ’zvezda’ intelektualaca kao što su habermas, Klajn, Žižek 
i drugi. Zabeležili smo dve vrlo opšte distinkcije; prva uključuje nekoliko geopo-
litičkih protivstavljanja kao što su nemačka vs. ostatak EU, Rusija vs. Zapad i na-
cionalno vs. nadnacionalno, dok druga pravi razliku između većine i privilegovane 
nekolicine/elita. Tvrdimo da su savremeni intelektualci još uvek uticajne javne 
ličnosti i da su njihovi napori više usmereni ka osnaživanju i reformi društava 
kroz postojeći sistem nego na promociju i zagovaranje alternatia postojećem ne-
oliberalnom društveno-ekonomskom poretku. 
Ključne reči: Intelektualci, neprijateljstvo, javno, elite, promene 

